US Extra-territorial detainees Wiki
Advertisement
No Title
[[File:Mohammed Sulamon Barre, at a press conference in Somaliland, shortly after repatriation 2009-12-22.jpg|250px]]
Mohamed Saleban Bare, at a press conference in Somaliland, shortly after his repatriation.

No Title

No information

Mohamed Saleban Bare (known to the Pentagon as Mohammed Sulaymon Barre) (born December 27, 1964) is a Somali refugee who was held in extrajudicial detention in the United States Guantanamo Bay detention camps, in Cuba.[1] His Guantanamo Internment Serial Number was 567. Joint Task Force Guantanamo counter-terror analysts report that he was born on December 27, 1964, in Burco, Somalia.

According to the Washington Post the allegations against Barre are internally inconsistent.[2] He is accused of involvement with al Qaeda, when it was based in Sudan, in 1994 and 1995, when United Nations documents confirm he was living in a U.N. refugee camp in Pakistan.

Combatant Status Review Tribunal[]

Main article: Combatant Status Review Tribunal

Mohamed Saleban Bare was among the 60% of prisoners who chose to participate in tribunal hearings. A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for the tribunal of each detainee, listing the allegations that supported their detention as an "enemy combatant". Mohamed Saleban Bare's memo accused him of the following:[3][4]

a.The detainee supported forces engaged in hostilities against the United States and its coalition partners.
  1. The detainee voluntarily traveled from Somalia to Pakistan in 1994.
  2. The detainee worked for the Dehabshiil Company [sic].
  3. The detainee was identified as a member of the non-governmental organization al Wafa.
  4. Al Wafa was identified as a terrorist organization on Executive Order 13224.


Transcript[]

On March 3, 2006, in response to a court order from Jed Rakoff the Department of Defense published an eight page summarized transcript from his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.[5]

Barre's Tribunal convened on October 29, 2004.[6]

Administrative Review Board[]

Detainees whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal labeled them "enemy combatants" were scheduled for annual Administrative Review Board hearings. These hearings were designed to assess the threat a detainee may pose if released or transferred, and whether there are other factors that warrant his continued detention.[7]

First annual Administrative Review Board hearing[]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his first annual Administrative Review Board hearing, on September 22, 2005.[8]

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Connections
  1. The detainee worked for the Dahabshiil Company in Karachi, Pakistan.
  2. Dahabshiil is closely related to Al-Barakaat, a Somali financial company designated by the United States Government as a terrorist finance facilitator. Following Al-Barakaat’s designation and shutdown, Dahabshiil took over much of Al-Barakaat’s business.
  3. The detainee was identified as a member of the non-governmental organization al Wafa.
  4. The al Wafa organization has been identified as a terrorist organization on the United States’ State Department’s Terrorist Exclusion list.
  5. The non-governmental organization al Wafa reportedly was believed to have had connections to Usama Bin Laden and Afghan Mujahidin.
  6. The detainee received a Tablighi Jamiat Visa [sic] to Pakistan.
  7. Jama’at Al Tablighi, a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization that is being used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, to include [sic] members of al Qaida.
b. Other Relevant Data
  1. The detainee ran an illegal money transfer business out of his home.
  2. Some of the detainee’s counterparts in the United States did not have licenses. They were operating illegally, also out of their houses. In addition, there was reason to believe that the detainee had contact with people involved in the support network for al Qaida.
  3. The detainee lied to obtain his three-month Pakistani visa.
  4. The detainee was captured after Pakistani authorities had conducted three raids on his home and finally detained him for illegal money transfer.[9]


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.
The detainee, during his oral Combatant Status Review Tribunal statement, stated that he had no knowledge of al Wafa until he entered prison in Pakistan.


Transcript[]

Barre chose to participate in his Administrative Review Board hearing.[10]

Barre's Response to the factors[]

Second annual Administrative Review Board hearing[]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his second annual Administrative Review Board hearing, on 4 October 2006.[11]

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a. Commitment
  1. The detainee was identified as a Mujahedin in Afghanistan until 1992.
b. Training
  1. The detainee was identified as a member of an institute operated by a senior al Qaida member in Qandahar [sic] that used to be associated with religious and language studies near a Mujahedin guest house.
  2. The detainee was identified as a participant of jihadist training in Afghanistan.
c. Connections/Associations
The detainee knew Usama bin Laden personally and, from 1992 to 1995, worked on Usama bin Laden's compound in Khartoum, Sudan. The detainee worked in the building occupied by Usama bin Laden's security detachment.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a. The detainee stated he never went to Afghanistan.
b. The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.
c. The detainee stated he never heard of the al Wafa Organization prior to his arrest by the Pakistani police.
d. The detainee stated the recipients [sic] of the funds he transferred were recorded in his business records on his computer that was seized by authorities.


Third annual Administrative Review Board hearing[]

A Summary of Evidence memo was prepared for his third annual Administrative Review Board hearing, on December 12, 2007.[11]

The following primary factors favor continued detention

a) Commitment
  1. The detainee was identified as being assigned to the artillery, to assist the first line in Afghanistan, in February 1992.
  2. The detainee stated he acquired a visa sponsored by Jamat-al-Tabiligh.
  3. The detainee stated he was sent 10,000 United States Dollars to start up a Dahabsbiil field office in Karachi, Pakistan in his home. Dehabshiil is a Somali based hawala, a money transfer service.
  4. The detainee stated he hired an individual to courier money for the detainee's Hawala operation.
  5. The detainee was identified as someone who hired an al Qaida courier.
  6. The detainee's wife was identified as someone who helped the Pakistani-based Somali al Qaida courier facilitate the movement of the family of an al Qaida operative.
  7. The detainee stated that after this courier left he hired a replacement.
  8. The replacement the detainee hired is tied to al Qaida's east Africa network and was known to provide fraudulent travel documents in support of that network.
b) Training
  1. The detainee stated he was conscripted into public service after finishing secondary school at approximately 18 or 19 years of age. The detainee was issued a uniform and sent to a refugee camp near Marko, Somalia, where he worked various jobs for approximately six months.
  2. The detainee was identified as being in an al Qaida artillery and preps camp in Afghanistan, in January 1992.
  3. The detainee was identified as being selected by al Qaida for more advanced training and specialized coursework at the Jihad Wal Camp, courses usually reserved only for sworn al Qaida members.
c) Connections/Associations
  1. The detainee' s hard drive e-mail in-boxes contained names of several individuals associated with al Ittihad al Islamiya, a terrorist organization affiliated with al Qaida that operates primarily out of Eastern Africa.
  2. Al Ittihad al Isiami, AIAI, is Somalia's largest militant Islamic organization. Some of its elements associated with the AIAI maintain ties to al Qaida. The AIAI conducted terrorist attacks against Ethiopian forces and other Somali factions in the 1990s.
  3. The detainee was identified as a facilitator and financier for al-Wafa in Afghanistan. The detainee was in charge of getting supplies, such as radios, computers, satellite phones and hospital supplies, from Pakistan into Afghanistan for use by the Taliban.
  4. The detainee attended an institute, operated by a senior al Qaida member in Kandahar, Afghanistan that used to be associated with religious and language studies and was near a Mujahedin guest house.
d) Other Relevant Data
  1. Numerous computer graphics files were found on the detainee' s computer that depicted Islamic extremists, resistance fighters or Mujahedin fighting in Afghanistan, combat scenes from Afghanistan, the damaged World Trade Center, Usama bin Laden and terrorist organizations.
  2. According to the detainee in November 2001, Pakistani government officials arrested the detainee for illegal money transfers.
  3. The detainee stated that at the time of his arrest, he had approximately 200-300 customers from his Dahabshiil business and could receive up to 900 United States Dollars per month in commissions.


The following primary factors favor release or transfer

a) The detainee stated he was never involved in an armed conflict in Somalia.
b) The detainee stated the only time he has ever been to Afghanistan was when he was taken there after being captured in 2002 . The detainee denied ever being a fighter in Mujahedin against the Soviets or otherwise.
c) The detainee stated he was never involved in an Islamic Militant group or knowingly transferred funds for their cause.
d) The detainee stated if he ever transferred money for a bad person it was unknowingly.
e) The detainee stated he had never heard of the al Wafa organization prior to his arrest by Pakistani police.
f) The detainee stated he lied to obtain his three month Pakistani visa by claiming he was going to Pakistan because he was invited by Jamat-al-Tabitigh. The detainee did not join Jamat-al Tabiligh and had no intentions of joining it.
g) The detainee stated that when he was in Islamabad, Pakistan, he registered his true name the United Nations organization, UNCR, as a refugee. The detainee stated his passport with was lost or stolen in Rawalpindi, Pakistan in February or March 1994. The detainee stated he did not turn his passport in to any guest house or to any person. The detainee stated he reported his passport lost or stolen with the Rawalpindi , Pakistan police at a station called Central Police.


Barre's refugee status[]

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees wrote the Pentagon, on December 20, 2006, seeking information on why Barre, and another man were being detained in Guantanamo.[12] The UNHCR had not known until December 2006 that the Americans were holding internationally recognized refugees in Guantanamo. Barre was granted UN refugee status in Pakistan in 1994. Mammar Ameur was granted UN refugee status in Pakistan in 1996. A third captive, Fethi Boucetta, was one of the 38 captives who was determined not have been an "enemy combatant" after all.

Al Barakat removed from the USA's watchlist of organizations tied to terrorism[]

One of the justifications for Barre's continued detention was that American intelligence analysts suspected that Dahabshiil, the Somalia-based hawala he worked for had ties to Al Barakat, another Somalia-based hawala that had its assets frozen, and some of its agents arrested, because it was suspected of laundering money for terrorists. On August 28, 2006 the BBC reported that Al Barakat had been removed from the US terrorist organization watchlist.[13] The BBC's report stated that al Barakat made the watchlist because American intelligence analysts had suspected it had been used to finance the 9-11 hijackers, but that the 911 Commission had investigated this theory and found it baseless. Some al Barakat agents were also individually listed as suspected terrorist. The owner of al Barakat, Ahmed Nur Ali Jimaale, said that the company's agent in Sweden was the last to be cleared of suspicion.

Letter to President Obama from Mohammed's father[]

On June 26, 2009 the Washington Post published a letter to United States President Barack Obama from Mohammed's father, Sulaymon Barre Ali.[14][15]

New habeas corpus petition[]

On 28 June 2008 the Washington Post reported that the Supreme Court's ruling in Boumediene v. Bush would allow Mohammed Sulaymon Barre to file a habeas corpus petition.[16] J. Wells Dixon will be representing him.

On 15 July 2008 Emilou Maclean filed a "NOTICE OF FILING OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER ON CONSENT" on behalf of Mohammed Sulaymon Barre (ISN 567) in Civil Action No. 08-cv-1153 (HHK).[17]

On December 30, 2008 United States Department of Justice official Daniel M. Barish informed the court that the DoJ had filed "factual returns" in seven habeas cases, including Mohammed Sulaymon Barre's.[18]

Repatriation[]

Carol Rosenberg, writing in the Miami Herald reported that Barre was one of twelve men transferred from Guantanamo on December 19, 2009.[19] Rosenberg reported that Barre and another Somali had been arrived in Somaliland, where they were promptly released. She reported that, according to local Somaliland newspapers, the two Somalis had been transferred to a third country, and had arrived in Somaliland on a plane provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The other eleven men were: Ayman Batarfi, Jamal Alawi Mari, Farouq Ali Ahmed, Muhammaed Yasir Ahmed Taher, Fayad Yahya Ahmed al Rami, Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu al Haf, Abdul Hafiz, Sharifullah, Mohamed Rahim, Mohammed Hashim and Ismael Arale.[19] Abdul Hafiz, Sharifullah, Mohamed Rahim and Mohammed Hashim were Afghans. Asmael Arale was the other Somali.

The other six men were Yemenis.

After his release Barre described Guantanamo as a "living hell", and noted: "Some of my colleagues in the prison lost their sight, some lost their limbs and others ended up mentally disturbed. I'm OK compared to them."[20]

References[]

  1. OARDEC (May 15, 2006). "List of Individuals Detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from January 2002 through May 15, 2006" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. http://www.dod.mil/news/May2006/d20060515%20List.pdf. Retrieved 2007-09-29. 
  2. 4 Cases Illustrate Guantanamo Quandaries: Administration Must Decide Fate of Often-Flawed Proceedings, Often-Dangerous Prisoners [1] Peter Finn 2009-02-16
  3. OARDEC (September 19, 2004). "Summary of Evidence for Combatant Status Review Tribunal -- Barre, Mohammed Sulaymon". United States Department of Defense. pp. 89. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/000400-000499.pdf#89. Retrieved 2007-10-17. 
  4. OARDEC (2004-10-29). "Summarized Statement". United States Department of Defense. pp. pages 30–37. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/Set_52_3643-3869.pdf#30. Retrieved 2008-06-26. 
  5. US releases Guantanamo files [2] April 4, 2006
  6. Guantanamo Bay Panel Hears Three Cases, mirror of Associated Press, October 29, 2004
  7. "Annual Administrative Review Boards for Enemy Combatants Held at Guantanamo Attributable to Senior Defense Officials". March 6, 2007. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3902. Retrieved November 12, 2010. 
  8. OARDEC (September 22, 2005). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of" (PDF). United States Department of Defense. pp. page 19–20. http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/detainees/csrt_arb/ARB_Round_1_Factors_000495-000594.pdf. Retrieved 2007-10-17. 
  9. This factor was not recorded in the transcript from the hearing.
  10. Summarized transcript (.pdf), from Mohammed Sulaymon Barre's Administrative Review Board hearing - pages 144-156
  11. 11.0 11.1 OARDEC (2007-12-12). "Unclassified Summary of Evidence for Administrative Review Board in the case of Barre, Mohammed Soliman". United States Department of Defense. http://int-shared1.ec2.nytimes.com/guantanamo/detainees/567-mohammed-sulaymon-barre/documents/9/pages/586#27. Retrieved 2009-07-20. 
  12. U.N. refugee agency seeking information on 2 detainees [3] Carol Rosenberg 2007-01-29
  13. US ends Somali banking blacklist [4] August 28, 2006
  14. Father of Gitmo Detainee Pleads for His Release [5] Del Quentin Wilber 2009-06-26
  15. letter Barack Obama [6] Sulaymon Barre Ali 2009-06-24
  16. Guantanamo Detainee to File Habeas Petition [7] Josh White, Del Quentin Wilber 2008-06-26
  17. Emilou Maclean (2008-07-15). "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation: Doc 65 -- NOTICE OF FILING OF MOTION FOR ENTRY OF PROTECTIVE ORDER ON CONSENT". United States Department of Justice. http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2008mc00442/131990/65/0.pdf. Retrieved 2008-11-12.  mirror
  18. Daniel M. Barish (2008-12-30). "Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation: Doc 1430 -- NOTICE OF FILING OF FACTUAL RETURN". United States Department of Justice. http://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2008mc00442/131990/1430/0.pdf. Retrieved 2009-01-12. 
  19. 19.0 19.1 Guantánamo detention census drops to 198 [8] Carol Rosenberg 2009-12-19
  20. Guantanamo 'hell on Earth', says Somali detainee [9] Mustafa Haji Abdinur 2009-12-22

External links[]


{{{header}}}
{{{body}}}
Advertisement